The importance of cognitive styles as psychological antecedents of psychopathology has gained increasing acceptance over the past 2 decades. Although ample research has explored cognitive styles that confer vulnerability to depression, cognitive styles that confer vulnerability to anxiety have received considerably less attention. In the present investigation, we examined the looming maladaptive style (LMS) as a cognitive style that functions as a danger schema to produce specific vulnerability to anxiety, but not to depression. In 4 studies, we examined the psychometric properties of a revised measure of the LMS, its predictive utility, and its effects on threat-related schematic processing. Results provided evidence for the validity of the LMS and indicated that it predicts anxiety and schematic processing of threat over and above the effects of other cognitive appraisals of threat, even in individuals who are currently nonanxNow I moved like a man pursued-pursued by the clock, by the ghastly advance of numbers. The earth turned, inexorably, the hour was approaching.
As aptly demonstrated in the above passage, the most intense or intimidating circumstances often involve perceptions of threat as rapidly mounting, escalating, or approaching. We contend that such perceptions of threat (i.e., dynamic threat-related cognitions and images) represent the central component in evoking an anxious or fearful response. We label these perceptions of rapidly evolving threat and escalating urgency looming vulnerability. This construct implies that individuals process bits and pieces of information to formulate appraisals of the increasing magnitude or severity of potential threat. We posit that much of this activity occurs automatically and nonreflectively and involves the integration of incoming information with memories, attitudes, beliefs, and concepts developed from past experience.
The construct of looming vulnerability differs from conventional theories of anxiety in emphasizing the importance of the dynamic nature of psychologically threatening situations. Threats that induce anxiety are seen by the individual as frequently changing, or subject to change, even during single, moment-in-time appraisals. Consequently, individuals develop expectations about how threatening situations are likely to progress that guide their behavior and influence their information processing. Therefore, a complete cognitive theory of anxiety must consider appraisals and expectations about the dynamic, ecologically valid aspects of threat. Understanding the person's subjective judgments and ex-pectations about the dynamic aspects of threat is fundamental to understanding anxiety.
Anxiety is viewed here as an anticipatory state of active preparation for dealing with threat. A useful metaphor for this anticipatory state is provided by ethological and developmental studies on visual looming (e.g., Gibson, 1979) . Many studies show that animals as diverse as fish, fowl, crabs, and primates respond with agitation, fear, and defensive reactions when confronted with a rapidly approaching, optically expanding, threatening stimulus (Fanselow, 1994; Gibson, 1979; Nanez, 1988) . This literature offers species-wide evidence for an evolutionary link between anxiety and rapidly approaching, or looming, danger. Looming vulnerability may be relatively more complex in human beings because central to human evolution is a unique "autonoetic" ability to be self-aware in a spatiotemporal context and to mentally project oneself into the past and the future (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) . The looming vulnerability model holds that this ability to project into the future provides the basis for generating anxiety and distinguishes anxiety from fear of more immediate, realistic threats. Further, this model emphasizes the important contributions of both externally derived conditions and internally generated conditions in the development, maintenance, and exacerbation of anxiety.
The construct of looming vulnerability refers to the internal generation of expectations, or mental scenarios, that involve rapidly rising risk. This process involves the simulation of real or hypothetical events, including rehearsals of potential time courses of future events and fantasies about the future (Taylor & Pham, 1996) . Social-cognitive research (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) postulates that individuals are continually constructing mental scenarios in which they simulate events and their possible outcomes. In developing such mental scenarios, externally derived conditions may provide the initial catalyst, but individuals also internally generate expectations of rapidly unfolding event sequences and their consequences. For example, Hsee and Abelson (1990) provided evidence that individuals react affectively to appraisals concerning 837 the rates of change of possible negative events, as well as the outcome of the events themselves. Cognitive theories of anxiety (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) have largely focused on static judgements of the threatening situation, but fail to sufficiently account for individuals' expectations of the dynamics of threatening situations. These expectations of rapidly rising risk are derived from, or influenced by, individuals' event schemata, or cognitive scripts (e.g., Riskind, 1997; Riskind, Kelly, Moore, Harman, & Gaines, 1992) . Event schemata reflect wellintegrated mental representations of temporal sequences of action in a particular context or situation (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973 ) that guide mental simulations of rapidly escalating threat.
Cognitive Styles
In recent years, interest has burgeoned in developing a more complete understanding of the cognitive factors involved in emotional disorders (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy 1989; Beck & Emery, 1985; Rachman, 1997; Rapee, 1996; Riskind, 1997; Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997) . For example, the ways in which people characteristically interpret events in their lives (i.e., their cognitive styles) have been shown to affect their probability and frequency of developing depressive disorders (e.g., Alloy, Abramson, Murray, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997; Alloy, Abramson, et al., 1999) . In particular, research on hopelessness depression (a subtype of depression) has empirically verified specific cognitive factors as potential risks in the development and etiology of depression (e.g., Abramson et al., 1989; Alloy et al., 1997; Alloy, ReillyHarrington, Fresco, Whitehouse, & Zechmeister, 1999) . A second reason for the increased interest in cognitive factors in emotional disorders is that research has illuminated the importance of cognitive factors in designing effective interventions (e.g., Burns & Seligman, 1989; Clark, Steer, & Beck, 1994; Steinberg, Alloy, & Abramson, 2000) .
Despite this increased interest, there has been comparatively little work on global cognitive vulnerabilities that are specifically related to the development of anxiety. We suggest that there should be important differences in both schematic content and information processing between anxious and depressive cognitive styles. For example, whereas depressive cognitive styles are seen as largely focusing on explaining past loss, anxiety-related styles are principally concerned with how individuals process, elaborate, and simulate anticipated future threat. Identifying the distinct cognitive content of anxiety from depression offers new insights into its differentiation from depression, affords more fine-grained experimental analysis, and should lead to more effective treatment. We propose that the concept of looming vulnerability involves cognitive content and phenomenology that is specific to anxiety.
Cognitive Style in Anxiety:
The Looming Maladaptive Style
We postulate a global cognitive style involving a tendency to form biased expectations about the temporal and spatial progression of potential threats. The pernicious effects of the looming maladaptive style (LMS) can lead individuals to mentally simulate active and dynamic scenarios involving relatively mundane, nonthreatening situations. For example, cognitively vulnerable individuals who imagine a meeting with a lover might exaggerate the speed of progression of real or imagined threatening outcomes (e.g., the dissolution of the relationship). The LMS is assumed to function as a danger schema and to produce schematic biases in the selection, interpretation, and recall of potential threats.
Empirical Evidence for the LMS
Numerous studies have examined the validity of the LMS and, more generally, the looming vulnerability model of anxiety (e.g., Riskind, 1997; Riskind, Abreu, Strauss, & Holt, 1997; Riskind & Maddux, 1993; Riskind, Moore, & Bowley, 1995; Riskind & Wahl, 1992; Riskind & Williams, 1999a , 1999b Williams & Riskind, 2000a , 2000b Williams, Riskind, & Long, 2000) . These studies have used a variety of methodologies to investigate the validity of the looming vulnerability model, including self-report assessments, computersimulated movement of objects (e.g., moving spiders vs. moving rabbits), the presentation of videotaped scenarios (e.g., a campus mugging, possible contamination scenarios, etc.), and the presentation of moving and static visual images. Further, these studies have investigated a range of cognitive-clinical phenomena (e.g., anxiety, thought suppression, coping styles, catastrophizing, worry, attachment styles, etc.) across a wide range of stimuli (e.g., individuals with mental illness, individuals with HIV, contamination, spiders, weight gain, social and romantic rejection, performance mistakes, etc.) and a diversity of populations (e.g., individuals with subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder, social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, subclinical posttraumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, depression, specific phobias, and subclinical eating disorders).
Several studies, using videotaped or computer generated stimuli or scenarios, provide evidence that phobic individuals exaggerate the extent to which their feared stimuli (spiders or germs) are changing, advancing, or moving rapidly toward them (i.e., looming; e.g., Riskind & Maddux, 1993; Riskind, Moore, & Bowley, 1995) . For example, individuals with spider phobia exhibit a bias to imagine spiders as rapidly approaching or likely to approach them. Moreover, individuals with a looming style for spiders demonstrated an increased tendency to exaggerate the looming movement of laboratory-induced threat situations and reported greater increases in anxiety when presented with forwardmoving stimuli, than those low in the LMS (e.g., . Individuals with subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder exhibit a specific sense of looming vulnerability to contamination (i.e., germs as rapidly approaching or rising in risk). Comparable associations exist between a sense of looming vulnerability and fears of Auto-Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Riskind & Maddux, 1994) , as well as fears of the public for psychiatric patients (Riskind & Wahl, 1992) .
On the basis of this experimental research, Riskind and colleagues devised a self-report questionnaire, the Looming Maladaptive Style Questionnaire (LMSQ; , designed to measure expectations about the dynamic progression of threatening situations (i.e., expectations that threat will actively accelerate, rapidly rise in risk, or progressively worsen). Numerous studies provide support for the convergent validity of the LMS (see Riskind, 1997 , for an early review; Riskind & Williams, 1999b) . Higher scores on the LMSQ are related to higher levels of anxiety as measured on the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Spielberger trait and state anxiety scales (rs range from .39 to .49; e.g., Riskind & Williams 1999a; Williams & Riskind, 2000a) . Other studies have found consistent evidence that the LMS is significantly associated with several correlates of anxiety, including worry, thought suppression, and behavioral avoidance (e.g., Riskind et al., 1997) . These studies have provided significant evidence for the specificity and discriminant validity of the LMS, suggesting that scores on the LMSQ can differentiate between anxiety and depression (e.g., Riskind, 1997) . Finally, previous research has demonstrated that the LMS predicts significant unique variance in anxiety not explained by cognitive variables such as subjective estimates of the probabilities, likelihood, or imminence that dreaded outcomes will occur (e.g., Riskind & Maddux, 1994) .
Overview of the Present Studies
Although these studies have provided consistent evidence for the importance of the LMS in anxiety, they have not examined the extent to which it functions as a danger schema. The present investigation examines whether the LMS is associated with schematicprocessing biases for threat-related information in a series of four studies. The first study refined the LMSQ and investigated the psychometric properties and the construct validity of the revised scale. The second study used a short-term longitudinal design to examine whether the LMSQ predicts vulnerability to anxiety over time. The third and fourth studies examined whether the LMS functions as a danger schema that influences schematic processing. These studies examined participants' schematic processing (e.g., memory) for potentially threatening material presented in either lexical (e.g., threatening words) or visual form (e.g., threatening pictures). The studies also examine the influence of the LMS on explicit-and implicit-memory tasks. Previous research has shown that implicit and explicit memory reflect different cognitive processes (Graf & Schacter, 1985) that can relate differently to anxiety (e.g., MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985 Mogg & Bradley, 1998) . If the LMS influences these two different types of memory, and if it affects memory for both verbal and visual threatening material, then this would provide evidence that it functions as a danger schema.
Study 1: Assessment of the LMSQ The first study investigated the psychometric properties of the revised LMSQ. The scale's construct validity was examined through correlations with multiple measures of anxiety and depression. Its convergent validity was also examined by correlations with common correlates of anxiety (metaworry and habitual thought suppression). Its discriminant validity was assessed in two ways: (a) First, a series of partial correlations examined the unique association of the LMSQ with anxiety, independent of depression; (b) second, the pattern of relationships between anxiety, depression, and the LMSQ was examined in a confirmatory factor analysis.
Method Participants
Participants were 158 undergraduate students (70 men, 88 women) who ranged in age from 18 to 58 years (M = 20.4 years, SD -6.34).
Participants were enrolled in psychology courses at George Mason University and received course credit for their participation. Most participants were in their first year of study: 57% of the sample were freshman; 18% were sophomores; 13% were juniors; and 12% were seniors. Further, the sample was relatively diverse in racial identification: Caucasian (56%), Asian (20%), African American or Black (13%), Hispanic (7%), and other (4%).
Measures and Procedure
All participants were asked to complete a battery of self-report questionnaires containing the following measures:
LMSQ. The thrust of the LMSQ is to measure individuals' tendency to view potentially threatening situations as rapidly unfolding or escalating toward dreaded outcomes (i.e., LMS). Participants read six brief vignettes describing potentially stressful situations and then completed an eight-item list of questions for each vignette, using a 5-point Likert scale. The LMSQ score was calculated by aggregating responses to three of these items across the six vignettes (e.g., "In this scene are the chances of your having difficulty decreasing or expanding with each moment? Is the level of threat in the encounter staying fairly constant or is it growing rapidly larger with each passing moment? How much do you visualize your problem as in the act of becoming progressively worse?"). The six potentially threatening vignettes included: (a) developing heart palpitations while talking to someone about a financial problem; (b) hearing a strange engine noise from your car as you are driving on the expressway in heavy rush-hour traffic; (c) the risk of getting into an accident; (d) speaking in front of a large audience of strangers: (e) inviting an extremely popular person to a party in front of a group of people; and (f) the possibility of a romantic relationship breaking up. These six vignettes constitute two types of stressful situations: (a) threats in social situations and (b) threats of physical injury, which we labeled social looming and physical looming for the confirmatory factor analysis. Preliminary analysis of the test-retest reliability of the LMS score suggest excellent test-retest stability (r = .91) over a 4-month time period (Williams & Riskind, 2000b) .
Several additional scales were constructed specifically for this study to provide measures of other cognitive appraisal variables. Participants' expectations of coping were assessed by two items: perceived sense of self-efficacy in the situation (e.g., how much are you imagining yourself as being able to cope with the situation or as having control over the threat?) and problem-focused coping (e.g., to what extent do you think you would actively try to solve the problem versus feel helpless or paralyzed?). A coping score was calculated by aggregating responses to these two items across the six stressful situations. Further, three single items on each vignette provide measures of participants: level of worry (e.g., how worried does your imagining this scene make you feel?), perceived probability of the situation occurring (e.g., to what extent do you think that this scene could happen to you?), and imagery (e.g., are your images of the scene more like brief flashes of camera snapshots, or more like rolling videotapes that are playing out a large part of a whole story?).
1 Anxious Thoughts Inventory. The Anxious Thoughts Inventory (Wells, 1994 ) is a 22-item self-report measure of individual proneness to worry (a = .91), however only the 7-item meta-worry subscale was used in the present study. This subscale is of particular interest in the present analysis because it measures "worry about worry" and the subjective experience of worries as uncontrollable, which is a core symptom of anxiety (e.g.. Wells, 1994) . (Paulhus, 1988) is a commonly used self-report measure of social-desirability responding, and it contains a self-deception (SDE) and an impression management subscale. In this study, only the SDE was used (a = .92). Self-deception is conceptualized as the unconscious process of deceiving the self to protect against threat; it assesses the stable characteristic of implicitly maintaining a self-protective stance.
Beck Anxiety and Depression Inventories. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988 ) is a 21 item validated self-report measure of anxiety symptoms (a = .90) designed for use in both clinical and nonclinical populations. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961 ) is a commonly used, 21 item, self-report measure of depressive symptoms (a = .90). TanakaMatsumi and Kameoka (1986) reported recent evidence for the BDI's reliability and validity.
Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire. The Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (Watson & Clark, 1991 ) is an 86-item self-report measure that yields a variety of subscales including an anxious arousal subscale (Anxious; a = .74) and an anhedonic depression subscale (Anhedonia; a -.82). The Anxious is presumed to measure anxiety-specific symptoms, whereas the Anhedonic measures depression-specific symptoms. These two subscales were the only subscales of the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire used in this study because they are the only subscales that are specific and unique to the measurement of anxiety and depression (D. Watson, personal communication, March 1997) .
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) contains two 20-item scales of state and trait anxiety. The state anxiety scale (a = .93) measures level of severity of present anxiety symptoms, whereas the trait anxiety scale (a = .84) is presumed to measure enduring symptoms of anxiety.
White Bear Suppression Inventory. The White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994 ) (a = .91) is a 15-item self-report measure of chronic differences in thought suppression, in which the individual attempts to remove unwanted thoughts from awareness (Wegner, 1992) . Scores on the White Bear Suppression Inventory have been shown to correlate with measures of obsessional thinking, anxiety, and failure to habituate to emotional thoughts. Thought suppression was examined in this study because of its theoretical and empirical links to anxiety (e.g., Rachman, 1997 Rachman, , 1998 .
Results

Reliability
Interitem correlations were computed for the LMSQ and the four additional scales that were constructed for use in this study. In the total sample (n = 158), interitem correlations for the LMSQ ranged from r = .51 to r = .67, with a mean r of .58. All interitem correlations were significant at the p < .01 level. In addition, Cronbach coefficient alpha suggests a high level of internal consistency for the LMSQ (a = .91). Further, Cronbach coefficient alphas conducted on the additional scales indicate acceptable levels of internal consistency: coping (a = .81), worry (a = .77), imagery (a = .78), and perceived probability (a = .66).
Intercorrelations for the Revised LMSQ and Additional Scales
Pearson product-moment correlations between the LMSQ and the additional scales are reported in Table 1 . The high correlation, r = .79, between the LMSQ and the worry subscale of the LMSQ provides evidence that these are highly related processes. The LMSQ was also moderately correlated with the coping, probability, and imagery subscales; however, the results described below suggest that the LMSQ and the constructed subscales are measuring empirically distinct constructs.
Validity
Results support the validity of the LMSQ as a measure of an anticipatory cognitive style related to anxiety. Table 2 presents the Pearson product-moment correlations between the LMSQ and the other measures of anxiety, depression, worry, and thought suppression. As predicted, the LMSQ was positively related to all measures of anxiety and to the measured correlates of anxiety, including worry and thought suppression. Further, the LMSQ was related to one measure of depression, but was not related to the other. These results indicate that higher levels of the LMS are related to higher levels of anxiety, worry, and habitual thought suppression.
2
LMS: Specificity to Anxiety
Our theoretical model predicts that the LMS will demonstrate unique and distinct relationships to anxiety, but not to depression. The correlation between self-reported anxiety (BAI) and selfreported depression (BDI) was significant. To test the specificity of the LMSQ, we conducted a series of separate partial correlations controlling for self-reported depression, anhedonia, anxiety, and arousal. Correlations between the LMSQ and measures of anxiety remained significant when scores for depression were partialled (e.g., r = .37, p < .01 with the BAI). In contrast, the correlations between the LMSQ and depression measures were reduced to nonsignificance when the effects of anxiety were controlled (e.g., r = .14 with the BDI, when controlling for BAI scores).
Although the results of these partial correlations provide support for the specificity of the LMS to anxiety, several important issues remain unanswered. First, it seems important to examine the extent to which the LMS and anxiety represent distinct constructs. Second, it seems important to examine the extent to which the LMS distinguishes between anxiety and depression. We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to address these issues and further establish discriminant validity.
The data on two measures of the LMSQ (i.e., social looming and physical looming), and three measures of stable anxiety (i.e., the BAI, trait anxiety, and meta-worry) were analyzed in an all-X LISREL model. The two measures of the LMSQ (i.e., looming scores from the social and physical scenarios) were loaded onto a looming latent variable, and the three measures of anxiety were loaded onto an anxiety latent variable. Figure 1 presents the standardized path coefficients for this model. The two looming measures loaded significantly onto the looming latent variable, whereas the three anxiety measures loaded significantly onto the anxiety latent variable. Further, although the two latent variables did correlate significantly with one another, the factorial structure of the measures was as expected. Indices of model fit such as the root-mean-square error of approximation, the adjusted goodnessof-fit index, and the normed fit index were all well within conventional ranges of acceptability. Moreover, modification indices suggested that there was little to be gained by adding paths from measures of one latent variable to the observed variables representing the other latent variable. While looming and anxiety are correlated, their measurement properties clearly provide evidence that they are distinct constructs.
The LMS Differs From Nondynamic Threat Appraisals
We predicted that the relationship between the LMS and anxiety would be evident even after holding constant the contributions of other nondynamic cognitive variables. A series of partial correlation analyses confirmed this prediction, in that the LMSQ retained its significant relationships with anxiety on the BAI (r = .40, p < .01), trait anxiety (r = .30, p < .01), state anxiety (r = .30, p < .01), and meta-worry on the Anxious Thoughts Inventory (r = .50, p < .01), when scores for the probability of occurrence were partialled, and the LMSQ retained its significant relationships with anxiety on the BAI (r = .38, p < .01), trait anxiety (r = .43, p < .01), state anxiety (r = .35, p < .01), and meta-worry on the Anxious Thoughts Inventory (r = .53, p < .01), when scores for coping were partialled. Moreover, the significant relationships between probability of occurrence, coping, and anxiety measures decreased in both magnitude and significance when the LMSQ was partialled (rs ranged from .02 to .09 for coping and from .01 to .15 for probability of occurrence). This pattern of relationships supports the hypothesized strong, separate, and distinct relationships between the LMSQ and the other subscales that were constructed for use in this study.
LMS in Moderate to Severe Levels of Anxiety
Although this study was done on a college student sample, there was considerable variation in the participants' levels of anxiety. To examine the specific relationships between level of anxiety and the LMS, participants were assigned to one of three anxiety groups based on their factor scores on the latent anxiety measure from the confirmatory factor analysis. Specifically, participants were assigned to the high-anxiety group if they scored in the top 20% of the distribution of scores, the medium-anxiety group if they scored in the middle of the distribution (21st-79th percentiles), and the low-anxiety group if they scored in the bottom 20% of the distribution. As predicted, the three groups differed significantly on all anxiety measures, ps < .0001 for omnibus F tests, and each group differed from all others in individual comparisons using Duncan multiple range tests (with alphas set at p < .05). A series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on these data revealed that the high-anxiety group had clinically significant levels of anxiety on the BAI {M = 28.59) and on the Trait Anxiety Inventory (M = 58.00). In addition, the high-anxiety group was significantly higher on the LMSQ (M = 3.85, SD = 0.43) than the medium-anxiety group (M = 3.25, SD = 0.70), which, in turn, was significantly higher {M = 2.35, SO = 0.99 ) than the low-anxiety group. These results are consistent with findings from clinical populations that used the original LMSQ and provided further construct validity for the LMSQ (i.e., suggesting that the LMSQ can be used to identify meaningful differences in anxiety). 
Discussion
The results for Study 1 provide strong support for the reliability and validity of the LMSQ. Our results suggest that higher scores on the LMSQ were significantly related to higher levels of anxiety, worry, and habitual thought suppression. This pattern of relationships is consistent with our suggestion that the LMSQ measures a specific cognitive vulnerability to anxiety, but not depression. Finally, the confirmatory factor analyses reveal that the LMSQ and anxiety represent distinct constructs.
Study 2: Short-Term Prospective Study Study 2 examined whether individuals who possess high levels of the LMS are more vulnerable to anxiety than those who possess lower levels of this style. In this study, a variant of a short-term "behavioral high risk design" (e.g., was used in which individuals who were not currently exhibiting anxiety were followed over a 1-week time period. It was predicted that individuals with a higher LMSQ score would exhibit greater anxiety a week later than individuals with a lower LMSQ score. Thus, the purpose of this brief study was to assess the predictive validity of the LMSQ by examining changes in anxiety and worry over time.
Method Participants
A total of 71 participants was screened with an anxiety measure ( Costello-Comery Anxiety Scale [CCAS]; Costello & Comery, 1967) , LMSQ, and the BDI.
Procedure
The CCAS is a nine-item scale designed to measure an individui tendency to develop anxious affective states. Costello and Comery (19' reported good reliability and validity for the CCAS. A median split \ then performed on the anxiety measure, and participants scoring in lower half of the distribution were administered the Revised LM (LMSQ-R) and the CCAS after a 1-week time interval. The single-it worry subscale from the LMSQ-R was also administered at both Tim (Tl) and Time 2 (T2). The low-anxiety group consisted of 33 participa (18 females and 15 males), who ranged in age from 19 to 52 (A/ = 2] SD = 6.78).
Results
Pearson product-moment correlations are presented in Tabli for the LMSQ, anxiety, worry, and depression variables at both and T2. As can be seen from the table, the LMSQ showed good test-retest stability over the 1-week time interval for nonanxious individuals (r = .88, p < .01). Test-retest stability was also adequate for the worry scale (r = .79, p < .01) and the CCAS (r = .72, p < .01). Consistent with our selection of only low-anxious individuals, anxiety at Tl was not related to Tl LMSQ-R scores (r = .09, ns) or Tl worry (r = . 14, ns). However anxiety and worry were correlated in the unrestricted n = 71 sample (r = .49, p < .01).
A prospective design was used in which variation on the LMSQ at Tl was used to predict residualized anxiety scores on the CCAS a week later. Time 2 anxiety scores were residualized by controlling for Tl anxiety in a hierarchical regressional analysis. When entered at Step 1, Tl anxiety accounted for significant variance in T2 anxiety (51%), F(l, 30) = 31.6, p < .01. Next, we entered the Tl LMSQ score to examine the amount of additional variance predicted in residualized T2 anxiety. When the LMSQ score was entered at
Step 2 in the analysis, it accounted for a significant amount of variance in T2 anxiety among individuals who were low in anxiety at Tl (r| = 10%), F A (2, 29) = 7.24, p < .01. These results provide evidence that individuals with a higher Tl LMSQ score showed significantly higher levels of residualized anxiety atT2.
We also examined the extent to which the Tl LMSQ score predicts residualized worry scores a week later, using a similar hierarchical regression analysis. When entered at step one, Tl worry accounted for significant variance in T2 worry (63%), F(l, 31) = 52.1, p < .01. Next, the Tl LMSQ score was entered in
Step 2 of the analysis to examine the amount of additional variance predicted in T2 worry. When the Tl LMSQ score was entered, it accounted for a significant amount of variance in T2 worry scores among individuals who remained low in anxiety at T2 (r\ = 8%), FJ2, 30) = 7.52, p < .01. These results provide evidence that individuals with a higher Tl LMSQ score displayed significantly higher levels of residualized worry scores at T2.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 provide evidence that individuals high in the LMS are more vulnerable to anxiety and anxiety-relevant variables such as worry over time, even when they are not currently anxious. In particular, a higher Tl LMSQ score was related to gains in both anxiety and worry over a 1-week time interval among individuals who were initially low in anxiety. In the following two studies, we investigated the extent to which the LMS is related to a schematic-processing bias for threat-related information and functions as a danger schema.
Study 3: Interpretation of Ambiguous Verbal Stimuli
If the LMS functions as a danger schema, then it should bias the processing of threat-related information and influence memory for such information. Consistent with past studies, we used a homophone task to assess implicit memory, such that biased schematic processing would be evidenced if vulnerable individuals demonstrate enhanced performance for threat-related information. Past studies have found that individuals who are high in trait anxiety are more likely to select the threatening interpretation of ambiguous information (see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mogg & Bradley, 1998 , for reviews). In particular, these studies show that such individuals are more likely to select the threatening alternative of distinct spellings of homophones that have both threatening and nonthreatening meanings (e.g., dye vs. die or sleigh vs. sleigh).
We predicted that the LMSQ score would explain variance in homophone spelling biases over and above that explained by anxiety and nondynamic cognitive appraisals (e.g., probability of occurrence estimates). In addition, it was expected that individuals with a higher LMSQ score would exhibit a schematic-processing bias on homophone spelling, even when controlling for current anxiety levels. This schematic-processing bias may reflect both biased memory for threat-related information and increased salience, or accessibility, of threat-related information in cognitively vulnerable individuals.
Method Participants
A subsample of 102 college students from Study 1 participated in this experiment (40 men and 62 women). The participants ranged in age from 18 to 47 years (M = 20.00 years, SD = 4.18) and consisted of 55% freshman, 20% sophomores, 15% juniors, and 10% seniors.
Materials
Participants completed the battery of questionnaires used in Study 1 and then completed a homophone spelling task. The homophone spelling task consisted of 10 practice items followed by 14 neutral words (e.g., pen-cil), 14 threatening words (e.g., death), and 16 potentially threatening homophones (e.g., pain vs. pane, flu vs. flew).
Procedure
After completing the questionnaire battery, participants were presented with an audio-taped recording of a 54-item word list. Participants were instructed that each word would be followed by a tone, signaling them to write the word that they just heard. Words were presented in standardized random order at 10-s intervals, beginning with the 10 practice words.
Results
We predicted that individuals with a high LMSQ score would select more threatening spellings of the homophones than individuals with low scores. Pearson product-moment correlations provided evidence that the selection of the more threatening spellings of the homophones was significantly associated with the LMSQ score (r = .28, p < .01), as well as scores on several anxiety measures (r = .24, p < .02 with BAI; r = .20, p < .05 with trait anxiety; and r = .25, p < .01 with Arousal), and scores on the habitual thought suppression measures (r = .21, p < .03). In contrast, preference for the more threatening spellings of the homophones was not related to scores on the measures of depression (r = .17 with BDI, r = -.14 with Anhedonia) perceived probability (r = .04), or worry (r = .05). 
The LMS Contributes to Prediction of Variance in Homophone Spelling
The LMS was expected to predict selection bias for the more threatening spelling of homophones over and above the contributions of anxiety and worry. Structural equations modeling was used to examine the patterns of homophone prediction for both the LMS and anxiety. Specifically, the extent to which looming and anxiety predicted scores on the homophone measure was examined in an all-X LISREL model. As shown in Figure 2 , the standardized coefficient representing the path between latent LMS and the homophone measure was significant, whereas the coefficient representing the path between latent anxiety and the homophone measure was not. Moreover, although fit indices suggest that the fit of this model is quite adequate, elimination of the path from latent LMS to the homophone variable resulted in a significant decrement in model fit {\\ = 5.94, p < .05), whereas elimination of the path from latent anxiety to the homophone variable resulted in a trivial decrease in fit (Xi = 0.09, ns). Thus, these results suggest that the LMS and anxiety have distinct patterns of relationships with performance on the homophone task, and that the LMS contributes to the prediction of homophone spelling bias, beyond the contributions of anxiety or worry.
A second set of analyses examined whether latent LMS scores had effects on homophone spellings distinct from nondynamic cognitive appraisals (i.e., probability of occurrence estimates) and latent anxiety. Because of space constraints, we offer only a verbal summary of these results; however, corresponding tables and figures are available from John H. Riskind. Using structural equations modeling, we assessed changes in model fit for models with and without paths from looming to the dependent variable (i.e., homophone spelling). Once again, the standardized coefficient that represents the path between latent LMS and the homophone measure was significant, whereas the coefficients that represent the paths between latent anxiety and probability of occurrence estimates were not. Additionally, elimination of the path from latent LMS to the homophone variable resulted in a significant decrement in model fit (x\ = 9.35, p < .05), whereas elimination of the path from likelihood to the homophone variable resulted in a nonsignificant decrement in fit. Thus, results of this analysis suggest that expectations or judgments about the dynamics of threatening situations (i.e., the LMS) are associated with a selection bias for ambiguous information that cannot be accounted for by static expectations of threatening situations (e.g., probability of occurrence estimates).
Examining the Effects of the LMS in a Low-Anxiety Sample
To address the question of how the LMS influences homophone spelling even in a low-anxiety sample, we performed a median split of the 102 participants on the latent anxiety variable, and we repeated the analyses described in the preceding paragraphs with and without the restricted anxiety variable. As demonstrated in Figure 3 , in both cases, the standardized path coefficient from the LMS latent variable to the homophone measure was significant, whereas the paths from likelihood and latent anxiety were not. Again, there was a significant decrement in model fit associated with the omission of the path from the LMS latent variable to the homophone measure {\\ = 7.20, p < .05), however no significant effects resulted from the elimination of the paths from the other variables to the homophone measure. These results suggest that the LMS is associated with a schematic-processing bias even among individuals who are currently low in anxiety.
Discussion
These findings demonstrate that the LMS is associated with a schematic-processing bias for lexical material, in that a higher LMSQ score was linked to a tendency to select more threatening interpretations of homophones (an implicit-memory task). Further, the LMS was uniquely related to homophone performance, beyond the effects of anxiety, worry, and nondynamic expectations of threatening situations, even in currently nonanxious individuals. It is important to note that this processing bias may be a result of biased implicit memory for threat-related information or increased 3 With homophone spelling, the possibility of an artifact because of simple word frequency must be addressed. Hence, we classified the homophones into two groups: high and low frequency of usage in the English language. The high-frequency group consisted of seven homophones for which the threatening spelling was selected by more than 80% of participants in our sample. When the preceding analyses were calculated for both groups of words, only the low-frequency homophones exhibited the obtained relationships. The LMS was significantly associated with the number of threatening spellings selected for the low-frequency group of words (r = -.26, p <.01), but was not associated with the number of threatening spellings selected for the high-frequency words (r = .11, p = ns). Further analysis revealed that none of the other variables (i.e., anxiety, worry, probability of occurrence estimates, or depression) were related to choice of spellings for the high-frequency words. Thus, a word frequency artifact did not account for the results. salience of threat-related information in cognitively vulnerable individuals.
Study 4: Memory for Visual Stimuli
In the final study, we examined the generality of the schematicprocessing bias by using both explicit-and implicit-memory tasks and visual stimuli. Because the LMS is seen as an elaboration of the phenomenon of "visual looming," we expected that it would bias memory for not only lexical, but also visual information. Using visual stimuli in the study of anxiety may afford increased ecological validity because much of the threatening information that individuals encounter in online human experience appears in visual form (e.g., witnessing a reproachful look from a lover or encountering a traffic accident). Further, ethological research suggests that visual material may serve as the original "spring-board" for the individual's verbal appraisals of threat (e.g., Riskind, 1997) .
This study used a novel experimental task in which participants were shown a series of pictorial images that were classified according to their level of threat (Riskind, Chrosniak, Williams, & Gessner, 2000) . On the basis of the ratings of an independent sample of students (see , the pictures were classified as either threatening (e.g., auto crash), positive (e.g., flowers), or neutral (e.g., fish). Participants were asked to rate each image for threatening content on initial presentation (i.e., the encoding phase of the experiment) and then completed a frequency estimation task, a free recall task, and a word-stem completion task. It was hypothesized that the LMS would be associated with a schematic-processing bias in both implicit and explicit memory for threat-related material, and that these effects would remain significant over and above the contributions of anxiety on memory. As in Study 3, it is also possible that this schematic-processing bias may be due to increased salience, or accessibility, of threatrelated information at initial encoding in cognitively vulnerable individuals.
Method Participants
Fifty-two undergraduate students at George Mason University (19 men and 33 women), who ranged in age from 18 to 50 years (M = 21.10 years, SD = 4.18), participated in this study in exchange for course credit.
Materials
Participants completed a battery of questionnaires containing the LMSQ, BAI, and BDI, described in Study 1. In this study, the battery of questionnaires also contained the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, A 10-item word-stem completion task was designed for this study to assess implicit memory for threatening information. Eight of the ten word stems had a one-to-one correspondence to a picture that the participants had viewed, whereas two word stems did not correspond to any of the presented stimuli. Each word stem could be completed by using a threatening or a nonthreatening word (e.g., FI could be completed as "FIRE," a threatening word, or "FISH," a nonthreatening word). Further, each word stem could be completed using either a target word (i.e., a word corresponding to one of the pictures) or a nontarget word (i.e., a word that did not describe one of the presented pictures).
Procedure
Participants were presented with 45 pictures (15 threatening, 15 neutral, and 15 positive) on a television monitor. Each picture was presented for 3 s with a 1-s interstimulus interval. Participants were instructed to rate the extent to which the content of the picture was threatening using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not threatening to 5 = very threatening). This threatrating task provides a measure of how images were appraised at initial presentation (i.e., encoding conditions), such that we could tentatively examine the probability that differences in memory could be attributed to retrieval processes. At the same time, we recognize that it is possible that threatening images are more salient at initial presentation and thus lead to a stronger, more accessible, memory trace.
Explicit-Memory Tasks
Explicit-memory tasks require conscious or intentional recollection of previously studied information (Graf & Schacter, 1985) . Three different measures of explicit memory were computed: (a) the number of the threatening pictures that the individual recalled; (b) the estimation of the percentage of images that were threatening in content; and (c) the accessibility of the threatening pictures. Immediately after rating the 45 pictures, participants were asked to indicate what percentage of the presented pictures were threatening (i.e., to provide a frequency estimation). Next, participants completed a free-recall task. The recalled pictures were later coded as threatening, neutral, or positive by the experimenters and scored for their order of recall. The accessibility score examined the order of the first five pictures recalled, coded on a 6-point scale (e.g., if a threatening picture was recalled first, then accessibility was scored a 6; if a threatening picture was not recalled in the first five responses, then accessibility was scored a 0). The total recall score was the overall number of threatening images recalled, independent of the order of either recall or presentation.
Implicit-Memory Tasks
In contrast to explicit-memory tasks, implicit-memory tasks do not require intentional reference to previously presented information (Graf & Schacter, 1985) . Two measures of implicit memory were calculated: (a) the number of word stems that were completed with threatening content, and (b) the number of words stems that were completed to form target words specifically describing one of the presented visual images. After completing the free-recall and frequency-estimation tasks, participants were instructed to complete 10 word stems with the first word that came to mind. Finally, they completed the questionnaire battery.
Results
As expected, the LMSQ was significantly correlated with scores on the BAI (/• = .41, p < .01) and scores on the PSWQ (r = .33, p < .02). In addition, the LMSQ was not correlated with scores on the BDI (r = .10, ns). A series of partial correlations confirmed that the relationship between the LMSQ and the BAI remained significant when controlling for scores on the BDI (r = .40, p < .01), and that the relationship between the LMSQ and the BDI remained nonsignificant when controlling for scores on the BAI (r = -.09, p < .49). These results replicate previous findings on the specificity and discriminant validity of the LMSQ to measures of anxiety.
LMS and Recall for Threatening Pictures (Explicit Memory)
It was hypothesized that participants with a higher LMSQ score would exhibit a schematic-processing bias for the threatening pictures. Table 4 presents Pearson product-moment correlations between the LMSQ and other measures. These correlations indicate that the LMSQ is significantly related to the number of threatening pictures that individuals recall (r = .27, p < .05), thenestimation of the percentage of threatening pictures that they viewed (r = .46, p < .001), and the accessibility of threatening pictures recalled (r = .41, p < .01). Anxiety and the LMSQ were both related to the individuals' frequency estimation for threatening images, but only the LMSQ score was significantly related to the number and the accessibility of threatening images.
Next, a series of SEM analyses were conducted to distinguish the effects of the LMS from latent anxiety (based on BAI and PSWQ) on the three measures of explicit memory (i.e., recall, frequency estimation, and accessibility). Because of space constraints, we offer only a verbal summary of these results, but corresponding tables and figures are available from John H. Riskind. We examined changes in model fit for each of these three dependent variables for models with and without paths from latent LMS to the dependent variable. The standardized coefficient representing the path between latent LMS and the accessibility and frequency estimation dependent variables was significant, whereas the coefficient representing the path from latent anxiety to these dependent variables was not. Additionally, omission of the path from latent LMS to each of these dependent variables resulted in a significant decrease in model fit (Xi 2 = 5.45, p < .05 for accessibility, and Xi -12.45, p < .05 for frequency estimation). For the recall-dependent variable, the path from the latent LMS variable was marginally significant (p < .10), whereas the path from latent anxiety was not. Thus, results of these analyses suggest that the LMS contributes to the prediction of a schematicprocessing bias on all three measures of explicit memory beyond the contributions of anxiety.
Looming Maladaptive Style and the Word-Stem Completion Task (Implicit Memory)
It was expected that the LMS would also be related to performance on a word-stem completion task (a measure of implicit memory). In particular, we predicted that participants with a higher LMSQ score would demonstrate evidence of a schematicprocessing bias for threat-related information, in that they would be more likely to complete word stems that referred to threatening content. In line with expectations, Table 4 shows that the LMSQ was the only measure that significantly related to the number of threatening words that the individual completed (r = ,54, p < .001) and to the number of target words that the individual completed (r = .56, p < .001). The other cognitive-affective variables (anxiety, worry, and depression) were not related to the implicitmemory measures. A series of structural-equations analyses like those described in the previous paragraph were conducted to distinguish the effects of the LMS from the latent-anxiety variable on the implicit-memory measures. Once again, results revealed that the path from latent LMS to the word-stem measures was significant, whereas the path between latent anxiety and these measures was not. Further, omission of the path from the latent LMS to word-stem completion resulted in a significant decrement in model fit (Xi = 1518, p < .05).
As shown in Table 4 , the number of threatening images that the individual retrieved on the free-recall task was related to the number of threatening words the individual completed (r = .29, p < .04), but not to the number of target words that the individual completed (r = .24, p < .09). The significant relationship between the number of threatening pictures recalled and the number of threatening words completed led us to address the extent to which the LMSQ was independently related to performance on the wordstem completion task, with total recall controlled. Partial correlations revealed that the relationship between the LMSQ and the number of threatening words completed (implicit memory) remained significant even when the total number of threatening pictures that the individual recalled (explicit memory) was partialled, r = .51 , p < .001. This evidence suggests that the LMS had significant unique schematic-processing effects on both implicit and explicit memory.
Threat Ratings
As shown in Table 4 , participants' threat ratings of the visual stimuli were not significantly related to their scores on the LMSQ, worry, anxiety, or depression. The initial encoding conditions of visual stimuli (i.e., threat ratings) did not appear to be systematically influenced by differences on these variables. To examine the extent to which the LMSQ was uniquely related to performance on the implicit-and explicit-memory tasks, we calculated a series of partial correlations, controlling for participants' threat ratings. As expected, the LMSQ remained significantly related to total recall (r = .26, p < .05), frequency estimation (r = .45, p < .05), accessibility ratings (r = .40, p < .05), and both measures of word-stem completion (r = .54, p < .05 with number of threatening words completed, and r = .58, p < .05 with number of target words completed) when removing shared variance with threat ratings. Therefore, because only those participants with a high LMSQ score showed the processing bias for threat-related information and because the relationships between the LMSQ and the memory tasks remained significant when controlling for threat ratings, it is possible to attribute differences in recall to retrieval differences. However, this conclusion is tentative in that it is also possible that threatening images are more salient at encoding, which leads to a stronger, more accessible, memory trace and that our measure of threat ratings was not sensitive to this phenomenon.
Discussion
The results of Study 4 provide evidence that the LMS influences processing of threatening visual material and potentially functions as a danger schema. Moreover the LMS appears to have pervasive effects on memory for threat-related material on both implicit-(e.g., word-stem completion) and explicit-(e.g., recall and frequency estimation) memory tasks, beyond the effects of anxiety or participants' initial threat ratings. These results parallel the results found with lexical material in the previous study. Further studies regarding the nature of encoding and retrieval are necessary to clarify the specific mechanism(s) by which the LMS influences the processing of threat-related information.
General Discussion
These four studies provided uniformly consistent evidence for our hypothesis that LMS is a unique cognitive vulnerability to anxiety. Our findings confirmed the predicted pattern of relationships between the LMSQ-R and measures of anxiety and related constructs. Moreover, Study 2 provided evidence for the predictive validity of the LMSQ, in that people with a higher LMS score showed gains in anxiety and worry 1-week later than those lower in this style. Studies 3 and 4 provided evidence that the LMS functions as a danger schema, in that more cognitively vulnerable individuals displayed schematic-processing biases for visual and verbal threat-related information on both explicit-and implicitmemory tasks.
In general, the present studies addressed two principal questions: (a) Is the revised LMSQ a reliable and valid measure of a specific cognitive style or vulnerability that is related to anxiety? and (b) does the LMS function as a danger schema and influence processing of threat-related information?
Psychometric Properties of the Revised LMSQ
Study 1 confirmed the reliability and validity of the LSMQ-R as a measure of expectations about the dynamic rate of change of threatening situations as rapidly increasing or approaching, that is related to anxiety. The measure showed high internal consistency, and all predictions about the relationships between the LMSQ and measures of anxiety and related constructs were supported. The results showed strong correlations between the LMSQ and anxiety, assessed by the Trait-State Anxiety on the Spielberger Inventory and by the BAI. Further, these correlations are compatible, if not greater than, those obtained using the original LMSQ Riskind & Williams, 1999b) . In addition, these new findings demonstrated significant correlations between the LMSQ and measures of phenomena that are closely related to anxiety (e.g., worry, anxiety-related thoughts, and habitual thought suppression).
A confirmatory factor analysis using structural equations modeling suggested that the LMS is not simply another measure of trait anxiety, but rather that it represents a distinct construct with unique measurement properties. In particular, results suggested that the LMSQ is closely related to anxiety, but not to depression. This highly specific pattern of relationships between the revised LMSQ and anxiety is particularly striking in light of the overlap that is typically noted between anxiety and depression (Barlow, 1991; Watson & Clark, 1984) , particularly in nonclinical and collegestudent populations (Gotlib, 1984) .
Does the LMS Function as a Danger Schema ?
Studies 3 and 4 provided support for the relevance of the LMS to understanding psychological factors that influence schematic processing of threat-related verbal and visual material. Although one might wonder whether our cognitive vulnerability measure can be distinguished from anxiety, these studies show that the LMS predicts different outcomes than anxiety measures. For example, structural equations modeling revealed that removal of the path from latent LMS to homophone prediction (Study 3) or measures of explicit and implicit memory (Study 4) resulted in significant decrements in model fit, whereas removal of the path from latent anxiety to these outcome variables resulted in nonsignificant changes in model fit. Moreover, a particularly arresting finding was revealed by a structural equations model in a subset of demonstrably nonanxious participants, which showed that, even in this restricted sample, the LMS continued to predict schematicprocessing bias on homophone selection. Findings from Study 4 provided evidence that participants with a higher LMSQ score exhibited enhanced explicit and implicit memory for threatening visual stimuli. These studies indicated that the LMS contributes to prediction of a schematic-processing bias for threat-related information, beyond the effects of anxiety or other cognitive variables. Further studies regarding the nature of encoding and retrieval are necessary to clarify the specific mechanisms by which the LMS exerts this systematic memory bias.
These studies imply that cognitively vulnerable individuals may be prone to incorporate threatening information in both implicitand explicit-memory processes. This finding is somewhat different from the outcome usually associated with anxiety, in that most research has suggested that highly anxious individuals display a memory bias on implicit but not explicit measures (see Rachman, 1997 , for a review). Moreover, the cross-modal priming effect (i.e., from visual to verbal domains) is not a frequent occurrence in the literature (e.g., Tulving & Schacter, 1990) . These studies suggest that individuals who are cognitively vulnerable tend to interpret situations as being more dangerous and, in the presence of threat, activate both automatic and controlled processes to assess potential dangers. We base this implication on the idea that automatic cognitive processes occur without intention or conscious awareness, whereas controlled cognitive processes require intention, attentional resources, and are open to conscious awareness (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975) . Similarly, implicit memory occurs without intention or conscious awareness and is typically demonstrated through task performance, whereas explicit memory requires intention, awareness, and attentional resources (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985) .
Social-Cognitive Styles and Psychopathology
The present studies contribute to a burgeoning body of research in recent decades that has emphasized the social-cognitive aspects of different forms of psychopathology. On the basis of Beck's cognitive clinical model (Beck, 1976; Beck & Clark, 1997; , several social-cognitive theories have postulated that each form of psychopathology or psychological disturbance has its own specific and unique cognitive content. In particular, the hopelessness theory of Abramson, Alloy, and their colleagues (Abramson et al., 1989; Alloy et al., 1997) , and the familiar attributional theory of learned helplessness (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) , assume cognitive content that is specific to depression (e.g., Riskind, Castellon, & Beck, 1989) . Similar ideas have been elaborated by work on maladaptive styles for bipolar disorder (Alloy, Reilly-Harrington et al., 1999) , psychopathy (Newman & Wallace, 1993) , and other forms of psychopathology. This literature suggests that each specific clinical syndrome (such as depression, anxiety, or mania) may be associated with a distinct pattern of mental organization, mental events, and maladaptive cognitive style. Moreover, specific cognitive vulnerabilities are expected to exacerbate the risk that individuals will develop particular disorders.
Most past literature on cognitive vulnerability factors, or styles, for anxiety has focused on factors common to anxiety and depression, such as perceived uncontrollability and unpredictability (e.g., Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996) . As a result, relatively little insight has been offered into the cognitive factors that are unique to anxiety. Despite the abundance of work on cognitive factors in the domain of anxiety, most of this research has examined correlates of current anxiety, but little research has been devoted to cognitive factors, or styles, that might confer heightened specific vulnerability to anxiety in people who are not currently anxious. The present studies make an important contribution in suggesting that anxiety is related to a unique and specific cognitive vulnerability not shared with depression.
Relation to Other Current Concepts and Models of Anxiety
Although there are other social-cognitive models of anxiety, what makes the looming vulnerability model unique is that it emphasizes the importance of the dynamic phenomenology of the psychologically threatening situation. Current models assume that anxiety is evoked by cognitions about the absolute value of risksuch as the person's estimates of the odds of aversive outcomes. In contrast, we hypothesize that it is not just the absolute value of risk at a given time, but the perceived rate at which risk is rapidly escalating or changing that influences anxiety.
Recently, considerable attention has been directed to the relationship between worry and anxiety. Worry is conceptualized by some as a self-protective cognitive process that avoids or reduces the disturbing somatic impact of fear-inducing mental imagery by transforming such imagery into a more physiologically detached lexical form (e.g., Borkovec, Ray, & Stoeber, 1998) . In contrast, the LMS is conceptualized as a cognitive vulnerability that enhances fear-inducing imagery. Thus, the LMS is speculatively assumed to trigger worry (perhaps as a self-protective response to images and or perceptions of looming stimuli) while still remaining conceptually distinct. Moreover, the LMS is related to both fear responses in specific situations and anxiety about stimuli that are anticipated or diffuse (see Rachman, 1998 , for similar discussion of the difference between anxiety and fear).
Recent studies have also focused on the relationship between anxiety and catastrophizing (e.g., Davey & Levy, 1998; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) . Such studies show that individuals who are chronic worriers tend to engage in a dysfunctional catastrophizing sequence. That is, each step at which these individuals worry (e.g., "I may be short of money this month") leads to escalating steps of further concern ("I may be unable to pay my rent" or "I'll end up homeless."). A recent study suggests that the LMS predicts residualized gains, or fewer losses, in the extent to which individuals engage in catastrophizing over time (Riskind & Williams, 1999b) . The reverse was not true, however, in that catastrophizing does not predict changes in the LMS over time. The findings of Riskind and Williams (1999b) are consistent with those of Study 2 and suggest that the LMS is a fairly stable individual difference that acts to increase vulnerability to later catastrophizing, anxiety, and worry, while remaining conceptually and psychometrically distinct.
It can also be suggested that the LMS may provide a new measure and conceptual framework for understanding the dynamic interaction between cognition and biological processes underlying anxiety. For example, within Gray's model of anxiety (e.g., Gray, 1971 Gray, , 1987 , the dynamic nature of a threat stimulus would be important for maintaining activation of the behavioral inhibition system. The behavioral inhibition system responds to mismatches or violations of expectations that individuals form about the environment. To the extent that a threat stimulus is perceived as changing, the working model of expectations about the environment proves less applicable, thereby generating anxiety (e.g., Newman & Wallace, 1993) . Moreover, Gray lists novel stimuli as inputs that activate the behavioral inhibition system because they are perceived as unfamiliar or unpredictable-a notion similar to our hypothesis that perceptions or expectations about threat as rapidly rising evoke anxiety. Thus, our model of looming vulnerability is compatible with Gray's model and adds to his model by describing the nature of the "working models" that are likely to confer vulnerability to anxiety and result in a lack of habituation to threatening situations (see also Riskind, 1997) .
Future Directions and Implications
The focus of the current studies was on individuals from an unselected college-student population. Although some of these individuals undoubtedly would meet criteria for formal anxiety disorders, the sample as a whole was nonclinical. The looming vulnerability model makes the assumption that the kinds of schematic-processing bias and other phenomena observed here are also found in a range of anxiety disorders (e.g., Williams & Riskind, 2000b) . This assumption seems reasonable given the fact that heightened anxiety is an important element, and perhaps a trait-like psychological antecedent, of the symptoms of a whole spectrum of anxiety disorders (from simple phobias, to panic disorder, generalized anxiety, social phobia, and obsessivecompulsive disorder; e.g., Rachman, 1998) . In addition, many of the cognitive biases (e.g., attentional biases for threat information) found for anxiety in nonclinical populations generalize to clinical disorders (e.g., Ingram, Kendall, Smith, & Donnell, 1987) , as do many of the cognitive biases in other affect-related disorders (e.g., depression).
Although the findings of the present studies are promising, the generalizability of the LMS to clinical populations is a question that needs further empirical work. The applicability of the LMS to different anxiety disorders and anxiety-related forms of distress (e.g., social anxiety, terror management, health behavior), and dysfunctional personality processes provide avenues for future research. In addition, the looming vulnerability model of anxiety, and the LMS more specifically, may have implications for developing more refined case conceptualizations and increasingly effective treatment strategies for the range of anxiety disorders (Riskind & Williams, 1999a) .
Cognitive theories suggest that if the LMS functions as a cognitive vulnerability then it should predict the probability and frequency with which individuals develop future anxiety disorders, as well as anxiety symptoms (e.g., Alloy, Abramson, et al., 1999) . Although our second study found evidence for the prediction of anxiety symptoms with a short-term prospective design, investigations are needed using longitudinal designs to examine whether the LMS functions as a cognitive risk factor for anxiety disorders over extended time periods (e.g., years rather than weeks). Without such studies, it will not be possible to determine the extent to which, or the mechanisms by which, the LMS confers vulnerability for the development of anxiety disorders.
Finally, research is required to examine the physiological mechanisms that accompany the LMS and the experience of looming vulnerability. The evolutionary concept of "visual looming" implies that looming vulnerability is derived from biological as well as social mechanisms (Riskind, 1997) . The looming vulnerability model suggests that individuals with LMS will show accentuated physiological responses in the presence of looming or threatening stimuli.
Conclusion
This research makes several contributions to our knowledge and understanding of dysfunctional personality processes in anxiety (e.g., Ingram et al., 1987) . First the LMS may represent a specific cognitive vulnerability for anxiety, much as the depressive explanatory style represents a specific cognitive vulnerability for hopelessness depression. Second, the results of this set of studies provide evidence that the LMS produces a strong schematicprocessing bias for threat-related information, even when people are not currently anxious. Third, the looming vulnerability model provides important elaborations of Gray's (1987) theory of anxiety, as well as cognitive and social-cognitive models of anxiety (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) . In so doing, we posit that the looming vulnerability model brings the study of cognitive processes in anxiety closer to ethological and developmental observations of an evolutionary basis for anxiety and fear based on perceptions of rapidly rising risk.
In closing, we have proposed that anxiety, like depression, is associated with a distinct cognitive style. The LMS is a pattern of cognitive vulnerability that is strongly related to anxiety and related constructs, such as worry and thought suppression. This style is also related to schematic-processing biases in memory for visual and verbal material, on explicit-and implicit-memory tasks. Thus, our results suggest that the LMS produces a schematicprocessing bias, even when people are not currently anxious, that confers vulnerability to future anxiety. This style may constitute a specific cognitive vulnerability factor that fills the same niche for anxiety as the depressive explanatory does for depression.
